Understanding and Specifying Information Security Needs to Support the Delivery of High Quality Security Services by Su, X. et al.
Understanding and Specifying Information
Security Needs to Support the Delivery of High
Quality Security Services
Xiaomeng Su1, Damiano Bolzoni2, and Pascal van Eck1
1 University of Twente, Information Systems Group, Enschede, The Netherlands
x.su@ewi.utwente.nl p.a.t.vaneck@ewi.utwente.nl
2 University of Twente, Distributed and Embedded System Group, Enschede, The
Netherlands
damiano.bolzoni@utwente.nl
Abstract. In this paper we present an approach for specifying and pri-
oritizing information security requirements in organizations. It is impor-
tant to prioritize security requirements since hundred per cent security is
not achievable and the limited resources available should be directed to
satisfy the most important ones. We propose to explicitly link security
requirements with the organization’s business vision, i.e. to provide busi-
ness rationale for security requirements. The rationale is then used as a
basis for comparing the importance of different security requirements.
Furthermore we discuss how to integrate the aforementioned solution
concepts into a service level management process for security services,
which is an important step in IT Governance. We validate our approach
by way of a focus group session.
1 Introduction
Information security - the safeguarding of computer systems and the integrity,
confidentiality, and availability of the data they contain - has long been recog-
nized as a critical issue. Two current trends indicate that its importance is grow-
ing. First, the integration of computers into more and more aspects of modern
life continues. Second, cyber-attacks, or breaches of information security, appear
to be increasing in frequency, and few observers are willing to ignore the possi-
bility that future attacks could have much more severe consequences than what
has been observed to date.
The increasing concerns of customers, particularly in online commerce, plus
the impact of legislations on information security have compelled companies to
put more resources in information security. It is clear that senior managers in
many organizations are now expressing a much greater interest in information
security [8]. Understanding and specifying what kind of security an organization
need is however a difficult task. Many underlying goals (why and what security
is needed) remain tacit within organizations and requirements end up being ar-
ticulated as specifications of the security control baseline (how security will be
achieved) without a clear rationale. The problem becomes more urgent when
more and more organizations are involved in collaboration and commerce. Be-
ing able to articulate security goals and requirements consistently, based on an
accurate view of existing security capabilities, and using shared understandings,
becomes much more important. Networked business will be difficult to conduct
if the organizations involved cannot agree on why security is necessary; the scope
it should cover and what each organization expects it to achieve.
The complexity of undertaking an enterprise-wide view of security manage-
ment can be illustrated in the challenges facing chief security officers (CSOs).
Often CSOs are tasked with ‘securing’ the organization, but it may not be clear
what that means. As a result, the CSO is often left to answer very important or-
ganizational questions without specific guidance: (i) What needs to be secured?
Why, and with which priority? (ii) How to ensure that people agree on the above
issue? (iii) How can the CSO be sure that the organization has been ’secured’?
What will be used to measure success?
The aim of this paper is to develop techniques and instruments to help stake-
holders articulate the connection between security requirements and business
drivers in a systematic way. This connection is needed to provide the rationale
to prioritize security requirements. E.g., for a production company, the availabil-
ity of its production control system is of vital importance, whereas for a financial
service provider, it is important to protect the integrity of its financial trans-
actions. The reason of making explicit the business rationale behind security
requirement is twofold. Firstly, it forces the stakeholders to turn their intuition
into explicit judgments - judgments that are based on business goals and whose
underlying assumptions are discussed openly. Secondly, since hundred per cent
security is not achievable and the limited resources available should be directed
to satisfy the most important ones, we need a way to prioritize security require-
ments. The business rationale serves as the underlying criterion for evaluating
how important each security requirement is.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present our con-
ceptual model for linking security requirements to the business vision that mo-
tivates them, and we show how this model can be used to prioritize security
requirements. Section 3 discusses an application of this model in service level
management for security services. Our model has been validated by way of a fo-
cus group discussion, which we discuss in Section 4. We present related research
in Section 5, and conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Formulating and Understanding Security Goals and
Requirements
A security requirement specification tells what should be secured and why. It
identifies the organization; needs with respect to security. Consider, for exam-
ple, the differences between the needs of a university and that of a cryptographic
organization. The university fosters scholarship and open research: papers, dis-
coveries, and work are available to the general public as well as to other aca-
demics. The cryptographic organization, on the other hand, prizes secrecy. The
university will need to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the data, such
as grades, on its systems. It might also want to ensure that the system is avail-
able via the Internet so that students, faculty, and other researchers have access
to information. The cryptographic organization, though, will emphasize confi-
dentiality of all its work.
When an organization wants to secure its system, it must first determine what
requirements to meet. Given that organizations normally have limited resources
to protect its assets, it is equally important to determine which requirements
are more important and thus should be prioritized. To achieve this, we propose
to use a conceptual framework where security requirements are linked to the
unique business drivers of the organization in question. Figure 1 portrays the
conceptual framework. The business vision consists of high level business goals
the organization has. Critical Impact Factors (CIFs) identify what will be the
business impacts if security requirements are violated. Valuable assets and their
security requirements are inventories of security requirements. Valuable assets
and their security requirements have an effect on the CIFs and the CIFs in turn
impact the accomplishment of the organization’s business vision. In other words,
we can use an organization’s business vision to prioritize the CIFs, which can
be used to further prioritize the security requirements. To achieve that, three
subsequent steps need to be taken. Firstly an organization’s CIFs and business
vision need to be defined. Secondly, we need to enumerate valuable assets and
their security requirements. Thirdly, security requirements shall be linked with
CIFs and business vision. We will discuss them in detail.
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Fig. 1. Linking security requirements with business vision via CIF.
2.1 The business vision
Each organization has its own unique business vision that defines the very prin-
ciples of how the business wants to achieve its goals. This vision, moreover,
often changes over time to reflect changing circumstances. Notwithstanding this
diversity, scholars in business administration have identified certain “patterns”
in the business vision of leading firms. In this paper, we use the well-known
value disciplines identified by Treacy and Wiersema [23, 24] as a framework for
understanding the business vision.
Treacy and Wiersema argue that there are three generic ways a business can
differentiate itself from the competition, which they call operational excellence,
customer intimacy, and product leadership. Each of these three value disciplines
aims at creating distinguishing value for customers, but each does so in a different
way.
– A company striving for operational excellence focuses on offering its products
with the least amount of hassle possible and/or at the lowest cost to its
customers.
– A customer intimacy company aims at delivering exactly what its customers
want by investigating the needs of a narrow market and then customizing
its offerings to this market.
– Finally, a product leader aims at delivering radically innovative products
that create an unbridgeable gap with the competition.
Each of the three value disciplines leads to a radically different operating
model for the company: the culture, processes, management systems and IT
systems of the company. For instance, while operational excellence calls for highly
standardized business processes, the customer intimacy discipline requires just
the opposite: to meet customer requirements, business processes should be as
flexible as possible. Security requirements should be likewise aligned with the
requirements imposed upon culture, processes and management systems by the
value discipline chosen.
2.2 Identifying the critical impact factors
When security incidents happen, they may lead to damage to organizations.
Critical impact factors are the indicators of what kind of damage the security
incidents incur to the organization. They can include those within the control
of the organization (e.g. loss of productivity), as well as that the organization
may not be able to fully control (e.g., legal liability, and reputation damage). We
do not provide any explicit guidance for developing organization’s CIFs in this
paper. However, experienced executives and security officers generally identify
some CIFs because they are part of their management domain. Other sources
for identifying CIFs could include industry-specific CIFs or reviews of peer CIFs
if available (for instance, The Information Security Forum archives a category
of business impact [10]). Figure 2 illustrate an example list of critical impact
factors.
CIF
financial loss reputation damage
loss of 
productivity legal liability
Fig. 2. An example of Critical Impact Factors.
2.3 Selecting valuable assets and security requirements
The business vision can be used to guide the selection of valuable assets. Surely,
the assets that are critical for accomplishing the business vision are the valuable
ones for the organizations. For example, a financial service company that fo-
cuses on customer intimacy will consider its customer relationship management
(CRM) systems as extremely valuable, while a financial service company that
focuses at product leadership will likely value its systems for developing new
financial products even higher.
Information security is about defining encompassing systems and procedures
designed to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability3 of an organi-
zation’s critical information and technical assets [2]. Information assets are the
data and information, in either physical or electronic form, that is critical to the
organization. Technical assets are those assets that support the storage, trans-
mission, and processing of data and information and therefore are important to
transforming data and information to be used by the organization. People can
be an asset to the organization as well for similar reason – they can be a primary
way of storing, transporting, or processing data.
So, IT security is about safeguard certain desired properties. The core of
computer and information security is widely regarded as the preservation of three
factors: confidentiality (ensuring that information is accessible only to those
authorized to access), integrity (safeguarding the accuracy and completeness
of information and processing methods) and availability (ensuring that only
authorized users have access to information and associated assets when required)
[7].
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Fig. 3. A simple ontology of asset and security property.
Figure 3 depicts a simple ontology of asset and the security properties that
are in the scope. Such an ontology can be used as a starting point to structure
3 Some authorities treat communication security issues such as non-repudiation and
privacy-related issues such as anonymity as additional aspects of security.
assets and their security properties. It is a minimum set and can be extended. For
instance, some will include privacy issues like anonymity as a security property
too4. Using such an ontology, the assets and their security properties can be
structured accordingly. Figure 4 gives an example of a valuable information asset-
medical record, and its desired security properties - confidentiality, integrity and
availability.
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confidentiality
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availability
Fig. 4. An example of assets and their security properties.
2.4 Prioritizing security requirements
control
system
confidentiality
integrity
availability
CIF business
vision 
financial loss
reputation 
damage
loss of 
productivity
legal liability
improve operational 
efficiency
critical impact
managing  financial 
resources
comply with law and 
regulation
...
...
...
asset
critical impact
Fig. 5. An example of linking asset security requirement with business vision via CIFs.
To further elaborate the relations between security requirements and the
business vision, the connection between them can be established via the linkage
of CIFs. Figure 5 provides an example of such linkage for a production company.
4 Firesmith provides a list of security properties in his work [6].
In this example, the organization is stating that any compromise to ”availability”
of the ”control system” has ”critical impact” to ”loss of productivity”, which in
turn has ”critical impact” to the organization’s vision ”improve operational effi-
ciency”. The impact severity can be categorized according to the organization’s
needs. An example categorization can be critical impact, marginal impact, and
negligible impact. In this way, each security requirements can be connected to its
CIFs and the CIFs further to business vision.
Using the impact diagram like figure 5, it is possible to categorize and pri-
oritize the different security requirements. Requirements that have ”critical im-
pact” on CIFs, that in turn have ”critical impact” on business vision, should be
considered of most importance. These requirements shall be satisfied first if the
resources (time, money, manpower etc.) are limited. In this example, it means
that, for the production company, it is more important to mitigate threats to
the control system’s availability than for instance, threats to the control system’s
confidentiality. It is possible that one requirement may be linked to more than
one CIFs. When that happens the overall significance of that security require-
ment can be determined in a number of ways. For example, one can choose the
maximum impact level, e.g. if control system’s availability not only has ”critical
impact” on loss of productivity but also has ”marginal impact” on reputation
damage, the overall impact should be ”critical impact”. Alternatively, one can
choose the average impact level. The organization shall decide which combina-
tion methods best reflects its situation.
The reason why we use CIFs to link critical assets and their security re-
quirements with business vision is twofold. The business vision typically resides
at the strategic level. When the business vision is outlined, the stakeholders
do not normally have a security focus in mind. The Critical Impact Factors on
the other hand, reflect the business implication when security is compromised.
It is of course possible to directly connect assets’ security requirements to the
business vision. But then the shift of focus from purely technical level security
concerns to strategical level business concerns seems abrupt. The introduction
of CIFs makes the shift smooth and the line of reasoning easier to follow.
Once the requirements are categorized and prioritized, other techniques, like
attacks trees or misuse cases can be used to explore all possible threats and attack
paths that would lead to the violation of security properties. In this example,
it is to find out how the control system’s availability can be compromised. Our
approach is complementary to this line of work, in the sense that we provide a
business-grounded rationale for why certain security requirements are important
while others are not.
2.5 Discussion
A common way used in practice to get a very high-level specification and pri-
oritization of security requirements is categorizing every IT asset or project on
two dimensions [22]: risk level (low, medium, high), and security concern (con-
fidentiality, integrity, availability). Compared to our approach, this very simple
framework has several disadvantages: the security concerns are fixed, and there
is no explicit representation of the rationale behind placing an asset or project
at a certain level. There is no reference to the business vision whatsoever.
3 Integrating the Solution Concepts into Service Level
Management Cycle
The solution concepts presented in the previous section are of practical usage
only when they can be integrated into processes and activities conducted in
an organization. In this section, we discuss how our solution concepts can be
integrated in service level agreements (SLAs) in the context of IT governance.
Due to recent legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, IT Gov-
ernance plays an important role in large organizations. IT Governance aims to
improve the quality of IT services by introducing (or improving) controls and
practices, stressing the definition of roles and duties among IT personnel and
management. SLAs are considered one of the fundamental ways to define (and
control) expected quality for a certain supplied service and are widely used not
only between third parties (where a real contract exists) but also between units
within the same company. In the latter case, this enforces responsibility (since
both units together define what should be provided and in which way) and helps
in avoiding unpleasant situations where it is difficult to define what went wrong
(and who is responsible for that). Thus, SLAs perform an important function in
managing the quality of IT services.
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Fig. 6. Security sevice level management lemniscate adapted from [17].
Figure 6 shows an abstract process model taken from [17], which describes
the process of managing and maintaining service level agreements. In Figure 6,
it has been adapted to the security domain. The left part of the lemniscate
concerns the specification of security services (upper arrow) and the evaluation
and monitoring of the performance of the service provider (lower arrow). The
right part concerns the evaluation and monitoring of security service processes
(upper arrow) and the design and organization of those processes.
The SLA plays a pivotal role in this scheme. For example, a business unit in
a bank uses several software systems to run its processes. If the business units
wants to make sure that the systems are secured properly, it is important that
the IT department (service provider) and the business unit (the customer) make
explicit what services the customer will receive. In this case, for example, the
business unit’s billing processes are in operation 24 hours a day, so the availability
of the processes need to be guaranteed 24 hours a day. However, in order to decide
this, the service provider and customer together need to investigate the needs of
the customer. This process results in a SLA which states what the customer can
expect, but also what obligations the customer has. To the service provider, the
SLA forms the basis for implementing the service processes. Niessink argues that
in order to improve IT services, all four phases of the Service Level Management
lemniscate need to be taken into account [17]. The IT Infrastructure Library
(ITIL) gives detailed guidelines for many of the processes that play a role in the
delivery of IT services [12]. However, there are a number of aspects of IT service
delivery that are not adequately covered by ITIL. One of them is that there is
no structured guidelines to translate IT service needs into SLAs (the upper left
arrow). It is this phase (specifying and quantifying SLAs) that our approach is
designed to address.
The service level management lemniscate is an abstract model that needs to
be refined for the particular case at hand. Figure 7 shows our proposed refine-
ment, in which the upper-left arrow of Figure 6 has been refined into seven pro-
cess steps that can be categorized according to the model presented in Figure 1
(horizontal dimension). The vertical dimension depicts the distinction between
the IT demand side of an organization (Business, i.e. those organizational units
where IT is used but not provided) and the IT supply side (IT, i.e. those orga-
nizational units that provide IT services). The figure shows that in our vision,
the need for security services originate at the demand side, in the sense that it
is ultimately the demand side that is harmed by breaches resulting from lack of
security. It is also the demand side that is responsible for determining the busi-
ness vision and critical impact factors (but often, the IT supply side provides
help in carrying out these steps). The IT side then takes over, and the whole
process results in SLAs that formalize the relation between the demand side and
supply side.
The steps for specifying and quantifying SLAs for security services illustrated
in Figure 7 are as follows: 1) The business unit starts to define its business vision
by the help of identifying its value discipline. If the business vision already exist
as a result of earlier activities, this step can be omitted. 2) Critical Impact
Factors are identified based on a combination of industry specific CIFs , reviews
of peer CIFs and the organization’s own security officer’s input. 3) The valuable
business assets are listed and prioritized using the CIF impact analysis. This
step is performed by the business unit and IT security unit together. 4) For
the prioritized business assets, IT security unit identifies the IT assets that are
needed to support the business assets and further identifies the desired security
properties for the IT assets. 5) SLAs are prepared by IT and proposed to the
business unit. 6) Due to budget concerns and maybe other causes, business may
decide to accept a higher risk for certain assets in return for a lower service
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Fig. 7. Steps for structured translation of IT security needs into SLAs
price. 7) Finally, the new SLAs must be reviewed by IT to make sure that the
higher risks in one business unit does not impose unacceptable high risks to other
business units. This could happen because of the inter-dependence of processes
across business units.
4 Validating the Approach Using a Focus Group Session
We have validated the approach with two aims in mind: i) we wanted to examine
to what extent the approach addresses practical issues, and ii) we wanted to
known whether our approach has the potential to improve current practice. We
conducted a focus group session for the validation.
The use of focus groups has been gaining in popularity over the past few
years. The effort to find a qualitative way to generate a rich understanding of a
topic by having a group of people involved in a discussion, rather than by using
a single quantitative method, such as a survey, is the reason of its increased
popularity [9]. A focus group session is commonly conducted with a group up to
12 professionals, so it has similarities with small samples research. Focus group
sessions are useful to validate findings and gather recommendations that can
derive changes from design or new hypothesis [5]. According to Hartman, five
fundamental assumptions exist regarding focus groups: (i) people are valuable
sources of information; (ii) people are capable of discussing themselves and ar-
ticulating their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors; (iii) the moderator can help
people retrieve information; (iv) the dynamics of the group can help generate
valid and reliable data; and (v) group interviewing can be more effective than
individual interviewing in particular research circumstances [9]. In our research
circumstances, we find it an appropriate instrument to validate the usefulness
and suitability of the framework.
In our focus group session we presented the framework to a group of 7 profes-
sionals. The professionals are drawn from the IT security unit of a leading Dutch
bank (hereinafter referred to as Bank A). Their expertise range from technical
level issues such as access control to business level issues such as business im-
pact analysis. We explained our motivation of the work and why we decided to
include the elements in the framework. After that, we received comments, sug-
gestions and judgments from them and engaged in discussions. The results are
listed next:
– Are the three concepts (business vision, CIFs and assets) present in Bank
A practice? Yes. Bank A starts with business impact analysis, resulting in
3-level codes for every asset.
– The professionals agree that ISO17799 and COBIT do not provide guidelines
for how to translate IT security needs into service level agreements.
– At Bank A, information is the main asset. Assets and CIFs are in the circle
of influence of the IT supply organization. The business vision concept is
in the scope of the IT demand organization. The IT demand organization
is eventually responsible for choosing the right security level. This is then
recorded in the SLAs. The IT supply organization is then responsible for
actually reaching the security level agreed upon in the SLA.
– The IT department has service level agreements with the business units,
and it is the business units that are responsible for coming up with the
right security level. However, due to the intricate connections between the
different units, IT department also need to aid in this process to make sure
that business units choose the right level. Sometimes, the business units
choose a low security level when considering its operation in isolation. But
when examined in a bigger scope, it may put the company reputation in
danger or may incur bigger risks to other dependent processes. In that case,
IT department may advice the business units to choose a higher security
level. Should disagreement happen in this situation, top level management
shall be resorted to for final decision.
– There may be different business visions across different subdivisions of the
IT demand side. At Bank A, the IT supply organization (itself using an
operational excellence discipline) has to deal with all three disciplines on
the demand side, as this differs from business unit to business unit (e.g.
Mortgages is a product leader).
– The merit of this approach is that it is similar to what Bank A does in prac-
tice, and the professionals do quickly recognize bits and pieces of the ap-
proach. The difference is that the approach makes the whole process explicit
and structured. By doing so, it forms a good base for better understanding
between the IT and business part and eventually for providing tool support
for the process.
Our original intention with the focus group session was to evaluate the use-
fulness of our approach in practice. Based on what we gathered from the profes-
sionals (listed above), we can positively conclude that (i) the solution concepts
we proposed are recognizable in practice, (ii) the embedding of the approach to
the cycle of SLA management seems reasonable, (iii) the approach is useful in
providing a structured way to understand and specify IT security needs and (iv)
to connect security needs with service level agreements. In addition, the pro-
fessionals pointed out a few more lines of possible extension to the framework,
e.g. (i) dynamics: how to re-assess all assignments (of assets to CIFs and CIFs
to the business vision) in a changing world? and (ii) how to deal with security
awareness? The level of security awareness is a determining factor in how people
assess security risks, priorities, etc. We shall look into the possibility of including
the aforementioned aspects into the framework.
5 Related Research
There exist a number of security standards, among which COBIT (Control Ob-
jectives for Information and related Technology) [4] and BS7799 [3] are of partic-
ular relevance to our work. COBIT is an international de-facto standard for infor-
mation control and IT risk management, addressing IT governance and control
practices. It provides a reference business-oriented framework for management,
users and control and security auditors. COBIT defines control objectives but
does not provide guidelines on how to reach the objectives. BS7799 (originally
published in 1995) is strictly focused on IT security and it is divided into two
parts. The first part, Code of Practice for Information Security Management, be-
came an official ISO standard, ISO 17799, in 2000. It contains general security
guidelines including policies, practices, procedures, organizational structures and
software functions. The second part, Information Security Management - Spec-
ifications, became an ISO standard, ISO 27001, in 2005. It contains technical
requirements. ISO17799/27001 addresses a company’s security from a best prac-
tice point of view, which does not provide any answer to why certain security
mechanisms are in place for a particular organization. In [21], we argue that
both COBIT and ISO17799 do not define guidelines on how to prioritize in a
proper way the company assets and their security properties.
In the line of service management, the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is a
framework consisting of a set of management concepts and methods to maximize
the quality in delivering IT services. The IT service management section is split
into service delivery and service support. As part of the service management
implementation, the framework suggests to create a vision statement regarding
the general service quality improving plan, which should align business and IT
strategies. ITIL, however, does not provide any structured guidelines on how to
translate IT service needs into service level agreement.
Our approach is also related to the work of security requirement model-
ing. Sindre and Opdahl [19] suggest to have negative use cases or scenarios in
connection with security. Yu and Liu [26, 14] in their work shows actors and
misactors having contradictory goals in an extension of i∗ diagrams [16]. Links
such as ”break” or ”hurt” can show how an attack prevents the legitimate users
from reaching their goals, or how countermeasures can thwart an attacks. Van
Lamsweerde addresses malicious obstacles (called anti-goals) set up by attack-
ers to threaten security goals and threat trees are built systematically through
anti-goal refinement [25]. This line of work focuses on how to model threat, in-
cluding the threat actors and their attack paths. Our approach, on the other
hand, focuses on providing business rationale for explaining why certain security
requirements exist in the first place. We also address how to prioritize security
requirements, which is a problem not addressed by the other approaches. We
believe it is important to prioritize security requirements since not all can be
satisfied, because in reality only limited resources are set aside for improving se-
curity in organizations. Our approach can be combined with the modeling work.
First, the security requirements are ranked using our approach. Next, for the
prioritized security requirements, misuse case or attack trees [18] can be use to
model how attacks that will violate the security requirements could actually hap-
pen. A number of proposals have proposed enhancements to UML to cope with
security constraints. [13] proposes an extension of UML where cryptographic and
authentication features are explicitly modeled. Another proposal of enhancing
UML is the SecureUML language [15] which, however, is geared towards access
control. This line of work is fairly low level and is therefore suited to more oper-
ational analysis. A challenging line of research may involve the integration of the
above methodologies, so that one can start from a high level rationale analysis
of the security requirements with our approach and then continue down the line
to investigate possible attack paths using negative use cases and finally to an
operational specification using UML.
Finally, our work is also related to the work of security risk assessment. Tra-
ditionally, in risk assessment methodologies, e.g. OCTAVE [1] (Operationally
Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation), risk of each threat is deter-
mined by the impact of the threat once it happens and how likely it will happen
[20]. For the impact, a severity level (e.g. high, low or medium) is assigned. What
often happens is that the severity level is assigned based on the person’s own
experience without explicit rationale. Our approach can enhance this process
because it provides an explicit tie to the organization’s business drivers.
6 Conclusions
The ISO 17999 [11] standard on information security requires an organization to
protect information from a wide range of threats to ensure business continuity,
minimize business damage, and maximize return on investments and business
opportunities. It is clear from this requirement that information security is ul-
timately about business security. In this paper, we have proposed a conceptual
framework that makes the link between security requirements and the organiza-
tion’s business drivers explicit. The three main elements of our framework are
business vision, CIFs and valuable assets and their security requirements. The
connection between business goals and security requirements, once established,
can be used to provide rationale for prioritizing security requirements.
The conceptual framework presented in this paper is only useful in practice
when it is embedded in a concrete process for security management. In this paper,
we have shown how this can be accomplished in the context of IT service level
management. We have evaluated our approach by means of a focus group session
at a large financial institution. Our experience with the focus group session tells
us that giving people the appropriate tools to frame and structure their decision
making process in relation to the underlying business goals and encouraging
the right kind of dialog among stakeholders are beneficial to the delivery of
high quality services. From what we have learned, several directions for further
research become apparent. For example, our focus group indicated that creating
security awareness is a very critical success factor. It is also our intention to
extend our security management process to cover tracking and evaluating service
level agreements.
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